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Gender and Physical Science
A Hard Look at a Hard Science
Amy Bug
The reader should be reassured again that I do not intend to throw out
the baby of science along with the bath water of false views about sci-
ence. My concern is to identify more carefully where the baby ends and
the bath water begins.
Sandra Harding, philosopher of science
Re: identifying where the baby ends and the bath water begins, it is easy:
Define an order parameter that is one within baby space and 1 in the wa-
ter space. The baby ends at zero regardless of the sharpness of the front. . . .
So, although according to the bible water (1) was good to Moses (1),
leading him to the king’s court and heart, I would still run a Landau-
Ginzburg equation just to verify. . . .
Rafi Blumenfeld, physicist
This essay explores some aspects of the interplay between gender issues and
physical science. At the start, we acknowledge the paradoxical status of
physics (Keller 1985, chapter 4) as both gender free (an impersonal enumer-
ation of mathematical truths to which our universe adheres) and highly gen-
dered—of the male variety. If physics were not free from the influences of
gender, race, and class, how could men and women all over the world re-
produce the same experiments with the same results (to ten or eleven deci-
mal places in some cases)? If it were not highly gendered, then would it not
be equitably integrated, and would images of physics and of physicists not
conflate with images of male activities and male people in most of our minds?1
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Organizing one’s thoughts on issues of women in physical science is a
tough task. Immediately, the question arises: Which issue is paramount?
There are many questions that compete for attention, among them:
Did/do men outnumber women (the participation, persistence issue)?
Is/was there an exclusion of women from institutions of learning and
power?
Is there a gendered quality to the science itself ?
Need we assess/reform physical science education?
What are the images of science and scientists that are ingrained within
our society?
Though these questions are quite distinct, they resist being answered
in isolation, and their answers are intertwined in interesting ways. Further,
they have a continuity across time and place. They could have been asked
about science and society 200 years ago, 500 years ago, as well as now, and
the answers in different eras would inform one another. “We feel a lack of
intellectual respect from classmates. We often feel patronized in homework
sessions” is a paraphrase of a comment made by a physics major at our
small college. “I did not dare lay bare my impulse and intention to any of
the wise by asking for advice, lest I be forbidden to write because of my
clownishness” is a quote from the tenth-century scientific scholar and cleric
Hrosvitha (Wertheim 1995, 43). One gets a strong sense that these two
quotes, separated by a thousand years, might have emerged from similar
sources—from women struggling in a male-identified scholarly sphere.
The current wave of feminist scholarship has produced enormously
interesting work on the aforementioned questions. The plan of this essay
is to touch on a few of them. Perhaps this essay will serve best as an in-
troduction for people who are experienced in science but new to the field
of women’s studies (like me). Women’s studies has much to say about who
does science, how it is done, and how the character of the science and the
scientist are coupled.
Participation
A woman physics major looks around her physics classroom and, at most
coeducational institutions, finds herself in the clear minority. In the early
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1990s she could expect to find that women comprised about 25 percent of
her introductory physics class, about 15 percent of physics majors, and
about 3 percent of physics professors (about 1 percent more at a liberal arts
college, about 1 percent less at a university). If she attended a large uni-
versity, the most probable number of women who would eventually grad-
uate with a Ph.D. in physics would be between 1 and 5, the next most prob-
able, zero; these numbers reflect the fact that women in physics are
clustered at some institutions and completely absent from many others
(American Institute of Physics 1990). In the American Physical Society (the
largest professional organization of physicists) in 1990, women comprised
14 percent of members under age 30 and only 3 percent of members over
age 40 (American Physical Society 1993). This is a hopeful sign that women
are in the process of better populating the field. But a less hopeful sign is
the disproportionate way that women leave the discipline at all levels—the
so-called leaky pipeline. Also, apparent progress in women’s participation,
like the proportion of women earning physics Ph.D.’s, which rose from 5
percent in 1975 to 10 percent in 1990, is negated if one looks only at U.S.
women (Fehrs and Czuijko 1992). Their participation, as a percentage of
all physics Ph.D. recipients in the United States, was virtually unchanged
during that time. The increasingly international character of graduate stu-
dent populations had produced the rise in women’s participation. What ex-
planation for these lopsided numbers can one give the young woman in
college today? What reassurance can one offer that a life in physical science
is well within her reach?
As historians and philosophers of science know well, the history of
women in physical science (and participation in public scholarship in gen-
eral) has not been monolithic. Women’s participation has ebbed and
flowed. One period of flow began during the Renaissance, when human-
ism allowed some of the ancient, gender-based prejudices to be questioned
on several grounds ( Jordan 1990; Scheibinger 1989). There were defenses
of women from such thinkers as the Jesuit priest François Poullain de la
Barré, from whom comes the quote “The mind has no sex” (quoted in
Scheibinger 1989), and the use of Cartesian ideas as inspiration and to
demonstrate sex differences were limited only to sex organs. Even Leibniz,
though largely silent on the issue, asserted that women had leisure at home
and so should study (Scheibinger 1989, 39), and defenses based on women’s
innate superiority of nature were offered as well. This was also a period
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when, according to Scheibinger, there were “lexicons listing female wor-
thies in the arts and sciences.” But in the eighteenth century, as the pres-
tige of science began to grow, there were attempts to deny that women
had ever contributed to development of the sciences, or of the arts.
Scheibinger (1993) discusses the movement among eighteenth-century in-
dividuals to prove the intellectual inferiority of women to men, and non-
Europeans to Europeans. This was a time, argues Martin Bernal, when
there was an attempt to de-emphasize African and Asian roots to science
and to focus solely on the Greco-Roman contributions (Bernal 1993). For
example, one can read in some histories of science, as well as some cur-
rent elementary physics textbooks, that Galileo was the first to invent
and/or turn the telescope heavenward with the full intent to study celes-
tial objects, despite the fact that Galileo himself acknowledged that ancient
North Africans had optical devices that were essentially telescopes, and that
they used them for celestial observation (Van Sertima 1983, 13). Moreover,
the Western scientific revolution had firm roots in Arabic-Muslim and Asian
science and mathematics (Hess 1995, chapter 3).
There was a very dark period for remembering/crediting women and
non-Europeans in Europe and the United States from about 1920 through
1970. This facilitated the public perception today that, as Sharon McGrayne,
author of Nobel Prize Women in Science, puts it, “there’s been only one
woman scientist, Marie Curie. And people don’t know much about her, so
they think she’s boring. If they know about other women scientists, they
assume they don’t do world class work” (Hess 1994, 9). Happily, today there
is a comparatively rich supply of biographical material available on the “for-
gotten” women of science, as well as on living women scientists.2
Opportunity or Exclusion?
It seems important to put the scarcity of women’s faces and names in sci-
ence textbooks in historical perspective, and to consider the historical par-
ticipation of women in scientific and educational institutions. (While the
history I mention is a Western one, there is an important message in the
fact that African and Eastern educational history is so divergent; for ex-
ample, that colonial forces denied the African system of universities, which
flourished during medieval times, an opportunity to continue [Pappademos
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1983].) There was a curtailment of women’s educational opportunities in
medieval Europe that coincided with their expulsion from positions of au-
thority in the church. By the ninth century, there were new church schools,
only open to boys; girls had no access to organized education (Wertheim
1995, chapter 2). David Noble traces this parallel exclusion of women from
the church and from the practice of science as it culminated in the scien-
tific revolution (Noble 1992). The scientific revolution was a time of con-
ventional piety when science and church had not yet parted ways, but both
presented a united front against the participation of women. Wertheim
takes the “physicist as priest” metaphor to heart; the maleness of the two
archetypes allowed them to reinforce one another historically and,
Wertheim argues, today as well (Wertheim 1995, introduction and chap-
ter 10). Women were excluded from the medieval universities and from
the modern ones that cropped up during the Renaissance. Isolated excep-
tions were Italy and Germany. But no woman who attended ever set a
precedent for the admission of women. For example, the illustrious Laura
Bassi, a physicist, attended and then became a professor at the University
of Bologna in the eighteenth century. Her chair at the university was es-
tablished in such a way that it would dissolve when she left it, to avoid set-
ting a precedent of having a woman in that place (Scheibinger 1989, 16,
17). Consider how differently we might view the historical impact of
women physicists were there a Bassi Chair in physics at Bologna, the oc-
cupation of which conferred honor on the occupant. (And occupation of
which by an illustrious physicist would reflect honor back on the chair, as
does the Lucasian Chair in physics at Cambridge, once occupied by New-
ton and currently by Stephen Hawking.) The university educational situa-
tion in Europe did not even begin to amend itself until the turn of the last
century. For example, Lise Meitner, an Austrian physicist, was lucky that
Vienna opened its doors in 1901, and she was able to take classes there, and
then with Max Planck at the University of Berlin. Still, there was a chem-
ical institute nearby where she did her experiments and where they had
classes. She was not allowed upstairs and had to hide under the auditorium
seats to listen to lectures (Wertheim 1995, 193–97). Agnes Pockels, keep-
ing house for her father in Germany in the latter part of the nineteenth
century, had not even this meager opportunity. Her scientific knowledge
was based largely on books to which her brother, a university-educated
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physicist, provided access. Her dozen or so papers on the physical proper-
ties of liquid surfaces were based on research performed entirely in her
kitchen (Tanford 1989, chapter 11).
M. Sadker and D. Sadker provide an excellent summary of the history
of women’s education in the United States (Sadker and Sadker 1994, chap-
ter 2). No public schools were open to women until the early nineteenth
century. Oberlin was the first U.S. college to admit women, men, and racial
minorities of both sexes. But the “ladies’ course” was second rate. (Addi-
tionally, the women had to do the men’s laundry and serve them meals.)
Coeducation in universities began in the mid-nineteenth century when the
number of men attending dropped after the Civil War. But a subsequent
backlash against coeducation caused some formerly coed universities to
instead establish women-only, affiliated colleges. In the late nineteenth cen-
tury, “real” women’s colleges (as opposed to institutions that were, essen-
tially, finishing schools) began to open their doors; Vassar was the first. In
the middle of the twentieth century, most major universities and colleges
finally went coed. Even then, as conversations with women who matricu-
lated at that time reveal, women were regularly channeled into tradition-
ally feminine vocations (Sadker and Sadker 1994, 33–35).
A similar cycle of advancement and retrenchment was experienced by
women scientific professionals, according to Margaret Rossiter (Rossiter
1995a; 1995b), whose monumental works delineate the educational and
working conditions for women scientists in America. During the middle
of the twentieth century, women scientists were scarce in colleges, indus-
try, and government, and the fit was often less than perfect. For example,
because of anti-nepotism rules, physicists Maria Mayer and Libby Marshall
were appointed as “volunteer professors” at the University of Chicago, a
situation that was “awkward . . . but humane,” according to Rossiter
(Rossiter 1995a, 138). A quest for institutional prestige eroded the progress
women had made in securing faculty positions, even at women’s colleges
(Sadker and Sadker 1994, chapter 2; Rossiter 1995a, chapter 10). On the
other hand, for some physicists with the highest levels of research aspira-
tion and talent, work at small colleges was not the best fit. Emmy Noether,
a mathematical physicist (who had never secured a paid position during
her many years at Göttingen University), spent the end of her career at
Bryn Mawr College (Wertheim 1995, 190–93). But we should no more
imagine this brilliant researcher being completely fulfilled in an under-
226 Amy Bug
graduate teaching environment than we could imagine Einstein being so.
Lise Meitner, despite her growing desire to emigrate from Berlin in the
early 1930s, refused to consider a position at Swarthmore College, because
of its insufficient laboratory space, and/or lack of assistants for her work,
and/or inability to allow her to work with large amounts of radioactive
materials (Sime 1996, 149).
The Woman behind the Curtain
The theme of invisibility is one that pervades the study of women in sci-
ence. In an apocryphal story, the woman scholar gives her scientific lec-
tures from behind a curtain, so that listeners (male) will not be distracted
by her beauty. (Sometimes the story is told with Laura Bassi as the subject,
sometimes it is another historical woman worthy.) This veiled woman is a
potent metaphor for the fact that women’s contributions, and the names
of the women who made them, are often obscured. The Sadkers describe
an exercise wherein people are given 5 minutes to write down 20 famous
women—no sports figures or entertainers allowed (Sadker and Sadker
1994, chapter 1). How hard my class found the exercise when one of my
students suggested we try it!3 When we restricted the exercise to names of
scientists, it became virtually impossible. Why? Clearly our early educa-
tion bears some responsibility; the impressions that our early social stud-
ies teachers and books have made last a lifetime. (Students tell me that high-
school texts now put marginalized people in blue boxes. In my day, they
didn’t even have the boxes.) But this begs the question of why, in the first
place, women worthies should be marginal characters, and whether their
lesser historical and demographic weight is compounded by the fact that
their achievements are underestimated or underreported.
The model of women inventors is an interesting one to consider. The
Sadkers report that they saw middle-school teachers write lists of inven-
tors on the board, all male (Sadker and Sadker 1994, chapter 1). There was
no mention of how hard it was for women to get patents in their own name
until very recently; of new scholarship that shows that the routinely cited
discovery, the cotton gin, formerly credited to a man, was invented by a
woman. There was no suggestion that some enormously important de-
vices have been invented by women in the twentieth century (like the com-
puter compiler, invented by Grace Hopper, or the tunable dye laser, in-
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vented by Mary Spaeth). Sadly, despite the fact that women inventors are
now on about 8 percent of patent applications,4 despite the fact that at the
time the Sadkers did their research there were numerous books in print, at
various grade levels, describing the achievements of women inventors,5
the enduring stereotype is that women invent nothing, as described in this
excerpt of a letter that H. J. Mozans reproduces:
I was out driving once with an old farmer in Vermont, writes Mrs.
Ada C. Bowles, and he told me, “You women may talk about your
rights, but why don’t you invent something?” I answered, “Your
horse’s feed bag and the shade over his head were both of them in-
vented by women.” The old fellow was so taken aback that he was
barely able to gasp, “Do tell!” (Mozans 1913, 346)
According to Steven Shapin, a great deal of the hands-on scientific
work during the English scientific revolution was done by technicians who
were “triply invisible” to historians, to other scientists, and as relevant ac-
tors with control over the laboratory where results are produced (Shapin
1994, chapter 8). A minority of scientists, Robert Boyle among them, men-
tioned their technicians by name in print. Shapin compares these techni-
cians to the Victorian domestic servants, who were “not there.” Class in-
tersected with educational opportunity, which determined whether one
was an assistant with “mere skill” or a collaborator with “genuine knowl-
edge.” While women did not occupy these jobs in England, one can see
this sort of role being played in the series of women astronomers from the
sixteenth century onward (Wertheim 1995, chapter 3), people like Maria
Winkelmann, the eighteenth-century astronomer for the Berlin Academy.
Most of these women worked in Germany, all worked in family observa-
tories “under” husbands, fathers, brothers (like the sixteenth-century Dan-
ish astronomer Sophe Brahe), or even sons whom they had trained. All can
be viewed as examples of people working from a tradition identified by
Scheibinger as a craft, or artisan, tradition (Scheibinger 1989, chapter 3).
The work was hands-on and not viewed as very cerebral—charting astro-
nomical objects, preparing calendars. There is an interesting carryover to
the history of U.S. astronomers from the late nineteenth century onward.
Certain subspecialties were considered acceptable for women, those that
involved “large scale processing of data” (Mack 1990). These gave women
a path to professional employment as astronomers. Many women’s col-
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leges supported programs (e.g., Maria Mitchell’s program at Vassar in the
nineteenth century) that produced graduates who supplied major obser-
vatories. Pamela Mack notes that from 1890 to 1920 women authored 4
percent of astronomy papers in the three major journals. Of these, about
48 percent came from women at women’s colleges. However, many of the
women who made technical contributions to papers in that era do not ap-
pear as authors; the papers are written in supervisors’ names (Mack 1990,
75). Again, here are contributions of “invisible” women.
Joan Hoffman, one of my students at Swarthmore College, drew a par-
allel (antiparallel?) between the way a gentleman scientist heading a lab in
the seventeenth or eighteenth century might merely enable research, yet
receive full credit, and the way women like Robert Boyle’s sisters enabled
his research, yet received no credit. (Boyle’s older sister actually had his
chemistry laboratory commissioned and built for him in her manse, and
both of his two sisters provided constant intellectual, social, and emotional
support [Shapin 1994, chapter 8].) Ruth Bleier makes the observation that
in modern times as well, eminent scientists have “a veritable army of un-
paid or underpaid women behind them” (Bleier 1986, 4). Clearly, though,
the observation that women often receive inadequate credit for their roles
as enablers generalizes far beyond science to women’s roles in the work-
place and in the world economy.6 The discussion comes full circle if we ob-
serve, with Namenwirth, that today “[s]cientific research . . . becomes an
arena of competition for prominence and authority, not unlike the arenas
of business and politics,” and that in this arena there is a “[f]usion of the
scientist’s image with a masculine authority stereotype” (Namenwirth
1986, 23). An excellent summary of work by Merton, Traweek, and others
on the competitive culture of science appears in appears in the Wellesley
“Pathways” Report (Rayman and Brett 1993).
It is important to acknowledge that science was not what we would
consider a job in the modern sense—and indeed the word “science” was
not even coined—until the nineteenth century, when the word was used
by William Whewell (Whewell 1834). Understandably, the gentleman “sci-
entists” of sixteenth- through eighteenth-century Europe had a common
background of class, money, and leisure in which to conduct their work,
and scientists who rose from humble beginnings were rare.7 From the early
years of the scientific revolution, some women participated. But their par-
ticipation was at the fringes of scientific society, and only noble women
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like Queen Christina of Sweden or Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of New-
castle, could do so. Acceptable roles consisted of sponsoring learned men
in one’s court or home and engaging learned men as tutors. Acceptable,
too, was a father’s arrangement of tutoring in science or mathematics for
his daughters. But a woman’s trajectory always stopped short of an insti-
tutional affiliation. The British Royal Society was established in the late
1600s, and the French Academy around the same time. They both admit-
ted their first woman about 300 years later. Margaret Cavendish was per-
mitted into the Royal Society only for a visit, and only once (Scheibinger
1989, 25, 26). Although there were individual members who very much
supported her admittance, the French Academy failed to vote to admit
Marie Curie, even after she had won her (first) Nobel prize (McGrayne
1993, 29–30; Scheibinger 1989, 10). This limited trajectory for qualified
women reminds one of Rossiter’s term “the American Inconsistency,”
which refers to the fact that until only recently, American society educated,
but did not employ, scientific women.
Scientific books were sometimes published by women worthies, but
the identity these books always seemed to forge for their authors was that
of commentator, expositor, facilitator, not the originator of any of the ideas
they espoused. Emilie du Chatelet produced the first (and still the only)
French version of Newton’s Principia. Jane Marcet’s extremely popular se-
ries of books, Conversations on Chemistry, was credited with influencing the
young Michael Faraday to take up chemistry, particularly electrochemistry
and the study of “voltaic current” (Miller 1990; Bordeau 1982, 110).
Harriet Zuckerman’s book Scientific Elite is an interesting study of the
sociology around that ultimate route to visibility in science, the winning
of a Nobel prize. Bearing in mind that the elites in “nearly all departments
of social life come in disproportionate numbers from the middle and up-
per occupational strata” (Zuckerman 1996, 63), she finds it to be manifestly
true for the U.S. scientist laureates, as measured by occupational rank of
one’s father, which in turn correlates with other measures of socioeco-
nomic status. “While inequalities in the socioeconomic origins of Ameri-
can scientists at large have been significantly reduced during the past half
century, this has not been the case for the ultraelite in science. Even in a
system as meritocratic as American science, in which identified talent tends
to be rewarded on the basis of performance rather than origin, . . . the ultra-
elite continue to come largely from the middle and upper middle strata”
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(Zuckerman 1996, 67). Clearly, women are likely to occupy Zuckerman’s
“41st chair” (a reference to the French Academy, which has only 40 chairs).
Jocelyn Bell, the discoverer (while a student) of pulsars, did not win along
with her adviser. Lise Meitner never won, though she was nominated in
nine different years, almost always jointly with her coworker Otto Hahn.8
Yet, Zuckerman reports, when Hahn won with Fritz Strassman, he reports
it was “given to me for work I had done alone or with my colleague Fritz
Strassman,” and washed his hands of Meitner’s reported “unhappiness” at
being left out (Zuckerman 1996, xxiii; Sime 1996, chapter 14 and page 342).
In summary, we encourage our students to think of science as a field
in which excellent ideas are unambiguously so. We like to think of it as a
meritocracy, not subject to the fickleness of history, because one’s scien-
tific work speaks for itself. But if one is excluded from the only scientific
society in one’s country, its journal won’t accept one’s paper, people of
one’s sex are not even permitted in the university faculty club, one has no
way, either speaking or writing, to communicate one’s thoughts to peers—
all of these being the status quo for women until the latter part of this cen-
tury—one’s work can’t speak for itself; it is silenced.9 In the words of Mar-
garet Cavendish: “Being a woman (I) cannot . . . Publicly . . . Preach, Teach,
Declare or Explain (my works) by Words of Mouth, as most of the Famous
Philosophers have done, who there by made their Philosophical Opinions
more Famous, than I fear mine will ever be” (qtd. in Scheibinger 1989, 37).
Feminist Physics?
The issue of whether there is a gendered quality to physics itself is ex-
tremely complicated. One might begin with the hypothesis that all human
activities are deeply impressed with culturally determined gender norms
(Harding 1991).10 The error we physicists might be making, if we claim
that our subject is free of gender content, is to overlook how much our hu-
manity shapes our professional activities at all levels (Easlea 1986).11 (Of-
ten, as with racism, the majority group has the luxury of overlooking such
things, whereas the minority group does not.) As Elizabeth Fee notes, “the
scientist, the creator of knowledge, cannot step outside his or her social
persona” (Fee 1986, 53). One might continue by observing with Schuerich
that “Good work depends on exclusion of bias; value free science. Femi-
nists’ claim is opposite. But feminist revisions can correct previously un-
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detected bias. The conventional scientific method makes no claim that dis-
covery is context free, only that justification is” (Schuerich 1992, 3).The sci-
entist and feminist Ruth Bleier goes further yet, suggesting that “the sci-
entific method is generally viewed as the protector against rampant
subjectivity and the guarantor of the objectivity and validity of scientific
knowledge. Yet each step in the scientific method is profoundly affected by
the values, opinions, biases, beliefs and interests of the scientist” (Bleier
1986, 3). Clearly, ideas like these open the door to a fascinating debate,
which is currently unfolding in the literature thanks to the attention of
philosophers of science, Sandra Harding, Evelyn Fox Keller, Helen
Longino, and Karen Barad among them (Harding 1991; Keller and Longino
1996; Barad 1996).
Henry Bauer, in his book Scientific Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific
Method, points out how new is the interest of historians of science in the
“externalist” view, that the “context of discovery”—not just the “context
of justification”—is quite worthy of study, and quite fundamental to the
definition of science. The context of discovery was traditionally excluded
from consideration because it was a nonrational part of human experience
(Bauer 1992, chapter 6). Hence, it was defined to be irrelevant to science,
which was in turn defined as the rational side of the enterprise—a circu-
lar definition. Thomas Kuhn, of course, started the “externalist” revolu-
tion when he argued that the actual practice of science does not adhere to
the “scientific method” (Kuhn 1970). An important distinction made by
Bauer is between frontier science and textbook science. He argues that it
is impossible to have feminist textbook science, in the sense of a feminist
Newton’s law or periodic table. Textbook science is rectified by time, dis-
tilled into pure law, and represents a logical and coherent body of knowl-
edge with a broad base of people who have confidence it its veracity. The
creation of frontier science is a human activity, and the body knowledge
on the frontier is incoherent and unreliable. Feminist and other critiques
have a real foothold there (Bauer 1992, chapter 6).
As one example of a cultural context for frontier science, Stevenson
and Byerly point out that British home life had for centuries encouraged
the sort of “enjoyable tinkering” (on the part of the men) that led to promi-
nent scientific discoveries (Stevenson and Byerly 1995, 71, 72). Indeed, there
was some snobbery about this; they quote physicist P. Blackett as distin-
guishing this from the French tradition of idling around in cafés when in-
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stead people should be home in their sheds. Blackett was a photographer
who toiled in his shed; he looked through tens of thousands of alpha par-
ticle tracks that he photographed to find the first nuclear reaction, a colli-
sion with an alpha particle and a nitrogen molecule. (In response to Black-
ett, though, we might point out that his French contemporaries Marie and
Pierre Curie toiled for years in their shed to purify radioactive ores.) The
shed versus café debate was the heir to an earlier debate between the sa-
lon-based, feminine science of France and the institute-based, masculine
science of England. We might symbolize the steps that French science, and
ultimately world science, took toward adopting the English scientific cul-
ture, by contrasting the early-eighteenth-century collaboration of Voltaire
with the physicist Emilie du Chatelet (she helped him with his math) with
the later-eighteenth-century attitude of Rousseau, and also of Voltaire by
midcentury, whom Scheibinger quotes as pronouncing that “all the arts
have been invented by man, not woman” (Scheibinger 1989, chapters 4 and
8, and page 102).
To define physical science in a certain way, following the lead of Eu-
ropean “gentleman” scientists from the seventeenth century onward, has
brought the field of physics profound successes. Electromagnetism, ther-
modynamics, relativity, and quantum physics have all produced quantita-
tive predictions about the universe that hold with marvelous success—“un-
reasonable” success, according to Eugene Paul Wigner—that “we neither
understand nor deserve.” What is the secret to this success? Bruce Gregory
asserts that “Physics is primarily procedural. Its procedure is to uncover the
value of a theory by determining its consequences and then seeing if these
predictions are confirmed by measurements” (Gregory 1988, 187). Though
this is indeed a recipe for success, it is not a recipe unique to physics. Yet,
among scientists, there exists what Stephen J. Gould has referred to as
“physics envy,” and a notorious snobbishness of physics toward sciences
with less of a claim to universal truth.12 The subversive (for a physicist)
thought arises that we owe our success not to having such great answers,
but to confining ourselves narrowly to such great questions. Wertheim
makes this point, noting that the calculatores of the fourteenth century were
the first scholars to get a handle on velocity and acceleration, the funda-
mentals of a science of motion. But they also tried to quantify human stuff,
such as sin and charity (Wertheim 1995, 53–54). Perhaps physics took a big
leap forward around the time that Galileo dropped two masses from a
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tower in Italy, not because the methods changed but because physicists be-
gan asking only the questions for which their methods had good answers.13
Der Noether? Die Einstein
The following excerpt from a 1937 coffee-table book on chemistry speaks
for itself, as its gendered language and subject matter stake out the field as
a male domain: “Although nature, the great chemist, has provided man with
the prototypes and methods by which he has attempted, with considerable
success, to conquer his environment, her motives and objectives have sel-
dom been man’s. The beautiful silks with which man bedecks himself and
his womankind, . . . were created for far different purposes than those to
which man has put them” (Morrison 1937, 13). Responsibility in language
is one of the principles of feminist science espoused by Bleier, and others,
in the volume Feminist Approaches to Science (Bleier 1986, 16). The choice of
words in the teaching or practice of science will readily reveal gender in-
equities and can have the unfortunate consequence of maintaining them.
One cannot only excise the flagrant examples of sexist language, as in the
quote above. Inside the physics (and any other) classroom, even the gender
of pronouns matters. Various studies have shown that in hearing or read-
ing “he,” as well as “man” or “mankind,” readers and listeners presume they
are hearing about a male (Henley 1989, 59–78; Kramer, Thorne, and Hen-
ley 1978; Schneider and Hacker 1973). There is a recent trend in elementary
physics texts of depicting people in a way that is representative in terms of
gender and race, which is well-founded in this regard. However, the unwa-
vering custom in these same texts of giving names of famous scientists and
biographical snippets works to undo this progress. (Anthony Standen criti-
cizes this attempt in chemistry texts: “‘Culture’ and ‘human interest’ are
dragged in by the scruff of the neck in the form of little potted biographies
of famous chemists of the past . . . without giving anything extra that would
make the biographical facts interesting and worth knowing by tying them
in with the rest of history” [Standen 1950, 80].) In elementary texts, we can
see women as subject to the laws of physics as they throw Frisbees, ride bi-
cycles, wire circuits, and fire lasers, but we are simultaneously reminded,
thanks to these historical interludes, that not a single woman has “authored”
a law of physics. And sadly, “each time a girl opens a book and reads a wom-
anless history, she learns she is worth less” (Sadker and Sadker 1994, 13). In-
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deed, the importance of being first at articulating a physical principle or ef-
fect, which may or may not, depending on the vagaries of history, result in
having one’s name attached to it, is something that proponents of a femi-
nist science would question. It is at odds with accepted principles of femi-
nist science, which emphasize cooperativeness and collaborativeness (Bleier
1986, 16). Merton describes the “fierce competition among scientists
throughout history to be recognized as ‘the Discoverer’” (Merton 1962).14
No less a scientist than Einstein commented on how inappropriate was this
drive to be first in discovery, how reminiscent it was of the attempt to win
a game, or at sports (Stevenson and Byerly 1995, 44).
The tension between a woman’s scientific prowess and the societal
norms for her gender may be revealed in the language with which her
achievement is discussed. “Sich männlich erweisen” (has proven herself
manly) was how a university rector commended Dorothea Erxleben, who
was one of the first women to earn a German medical degree. “A Woman
who has translated and illuminated Newton [is] in short a very great man”
was Voltaire’s comment on Emilie du Chatelet. “The best man at Harvard”
was Edwin Hubble’s pronouncement on astrophysicist Cecelia Payne
Gaposchkin. “Monstrosity,” said August Strindberg of the great mathe-
matical physicist Sonya Kovalevsky. One could go on and on like this, but
as Sandra Harding observes, “it is important to see that the focus should
not be on whether individuals in the history of science were sexist. Most
of them were; in this they were like most men (and many women) of their
day. Instead, the point is that the sexual meanings of nature and inquiry . . .
express the anxieties of whole societies or, at least, of the groups whose
interests science was intended to advance. Cultural meanings, not individ-
ual ones, should be the issue here” (Harding 1991, 44). This should indeed
be the focus when we look at androcentric language in physical science.
What factors in the culture at large, and in the culture of the science, al-
low us all to accept the unspoken premise of a joke that begins “Why do
physicists have mistresses?”15 What factors are at work to make the term
woman physicist an oxymoron?
One interesting set of gendered metaphors within Western scientific
culture are baby metaphors. They provide a revealing view of scientific ac-
tivity through some scientists’ eyes, particularly those of some nuclear
physicists. Though it is only one subdiscipline of physics, thanks to vari-
ous political factors the field of nuclear physics has intersected strongly
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with weapons research. It expanded enormously in the middle of the twen-
tieth century and has thus set a certain pattern for the modern culture of
physics as a whole. One might also take a broader view and observe that
weapons research and physical science have long had a kinship. In the thir-
teenth century, Roger Bacon trumpeted the eventual development of op-
tical weapons to his pope (Wertheim 1995, 51). Newton depicted hunters
firing at game on the frontispiece of his book introducing calculus
(reprinted in Scheibinger 1989, fig. 22.), and so on. The ready identification
of physics with the military is, for example, one documented reason that
many schoolchildren feel science is a subject meant for boys (Kelly 1981).
Brian Easlea discusses Earnest Rutherford, the “father of atomic
physics,” at length. In Rutherford’s lab “the nucleus was born” (according
to C. G. Darwin, his student) (Easlea 1983, 62). That so-and-so is the father
of such and such field is a common cliché, yet it deserves a little thought.
If so-and-so is the father, then who is the mother? Or is it understood,
rather, that this is a special type of paternity, and no maternal element is
required? If so, one needs to consider the notion of uterus envy, empha-
sized by Easlea, Frechet, and others.16 On the other hand, if one considers,
with Francis Bacon, that the scientist has established “a chaste and lawful
marriage between Mind and Nature” (quoted in Keller 1985, 36), might
Nature be thought of as the mother? This would bring us to the Nature-
as-a-woman image with all of its complicated dimensions,17 including her
domination by a tyrannical, male science. As the poet e. e. cummings asks
in a poem addressed to the earth, “how often . . . has the naughty thumb
of science prodded thy beauty?”
But whoever the mother of such and such a field is, if indeed there is a
mother at all, she is of as little consequence as the mothers forced to remain
behind curtains in Bacon’s utopian community, Solomon’s House. Keller
notes, “In this inversion of the traditional metaphor, this veritable back fir-
ing, nature’s veil is rent, maternal procreativity is effectively co-opted, but
the secret of life has become the secret of death” (Keller 1992, 45).
The scientific humanist Jacob Brownowski starts his meditation Sci-
ence and Human Values by discussing a visit in 1945 to Nagasaki, soon after
it was destroyed by the atomic bomb. The popular song “Is You Is or Is You
Ain’t Ma Baby?” was playing on the car radio, and he asks whether the aw-
ful technology of nuclear weaponry, and the science itself, should be ac-
knowledged as mankind’s baby? (With Henley et al., perhaps we should
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understand the author to mean the male half of humankind.) Brownowski
sees science as a precious aspect of our society and he feels that this baby
should be acknowledged: “Science has nothing to be ashamed of even in
the ruins of Nagasaki” (Brownowski 1956, 73). The community of defense
professionals also take great pride (or hubris?) in this baby, as is revealed in
studies by Carol Cohn. She has written a series of papers about her inter-
actions with these intellectuals, almost exclusively male, who consult for
the government, working at universities and think tanks on issues of nu-
clear armaments. While these professionals are not, in general, physical
scientists, the physicist Freeman Dyson, who has consulted extensively with
the military, has confirmed that there is a similarity between the “world of
warriors” and of physicists. In both worlds there is a premium on staying
cool, using language that emphasizes technical accuracy and objectivity
(Dyson quoted in Easlea 1986, 146). They are both worlds where a certain
type of cartoonish masculinity is valued. (I say cartoonish, for it is a spe-
cial type of masculinity traditionally associated with scientists, one that, in
many ways, stands in opposition to stereotypical masculinity in our soci-
ety [see the works cited in note 1].) “Rutherford will think it very effemi-
nate of us to use a null method when we might” is how one of Ruther-
ford’s students dismissed a detection technique he eschewed as, apparently,
not macho enough (Easlea 1983, 61).
The atomic bomb project was, in Cohn’s words, “rife with images of
male birth” (Cohn 1987, 687). For example, Ernest Lawrence wrote to the
University of Chicago physicists, “Congratulations to the new parents. Can
hardly wait to see the new arrival” (quoted in Keller 1992, 44). At Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, the H-bomb was “Teller’s baby,” though
others said Stan Ulam was the father and Edward Teller was rather its
mother (Cohn 1996, 177). The comment originated with Hans Bethe: “Ed-
ward was the mother, because he carried the baby for quite a while”
(quoted in Easlea 1983, 131). Cohn notes that in this context, maternity is
being belittled by being equated with nurturance, as opposed to being con-
sidered an agency of creation. (This also belittles nurturance.) Those at
Livermore who wanted to disparage Teller’s contribution would ascribe to
him the maternal role (Easlea 1983, 131). The motherhood imagery was
also used in the context of a new satellite system: “We’ll do the mother-
hood role telemetry, tracking, and control the maintenance” (Cohn 1987,
687). The invitation to “pat the missile” that Cohn received on a nuclear
Gender and Physical Science 237
submarine evokes for her several images—patting something small and
cute, like a baby, is one of them.
Not only were atomic bombs not-of-woman-born, the ones that
worked correctly were male ( Jungk 1956, 197). “It’s a boy,” announces a
telegram from Teller upon the successful test of the H-bomb (quoted in
Easlea 1983, 130). Keller explains that a bomb with “thrust” is a boy baby;
a girl baby is understood to be a dud ( Jungk 1956, cited in Keller 1992, 197).
The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were dubbed “Fat Man”
and “Little Boy,” respectively. Curiously, when one sees photographs of nu-
clear generators—for example, the last image of Barnaby’s Man and the
Atom (Barnaby 1971, 207)—there is an unmistakable emphasis on the phal-
lic character of the device.
Cohn, Easlea, Keller, and others make the point that this world of nu-
clear professionals is a strange and surrogate world. It is one where life and
death are permuted, where bombs are babies, where creative people father
destructive monsters, as J. Robert Oppenheimer quotes from the Bhagavad-
Gita: “I am become Death, the shatterer of worlds” (Keller 1992, 45; Jungk
1956, 197). Given this bizarre culture, and given the assumption that it re-
flects scientific culture, should it surprise us that physical science will be per-
ceived as very one-sided, very “masculine”? The epigraphs that began this
essay play into this stereotype. Blumenfeld’s comment was a lighthearted
response to the Harding quote. He shows us how natural it is for a physi-
cist, a true heir of Galileo, to gravitate toward the methods that have served
physics traditionally very well. And how strangely these methods juxtapose
with a reality that includes sin and charity, parents and children—as if
Pharaoh’s daughter needed a detailed calculation of statistical mechanics
before plucking Moses from the river! To practicing scientists, women and
men, a crucial question can be whether one can strike a balance between
one’s own generativities of babies and of science. Easlea relates that Fred-
eric Joliot loved his new cloud chamber, and he would talk of the creating
of a cloud trail by an elementary particle: “Is it not the most beautiful phe-
nomenon in the world?” Whereupon, if Irene Joliot-Curie was in the lab
(pregnant at the time), she would reply, “Yes, my dear, it would be the most
beautiful phenomenon in the world, if there were not that of childbirth”
(quoted in Easlea 1983, 66). These attitudes did not stop either parent from
having children and creating artificial radioactivity, winning a Nobel prize,
being among the first to identify the positron, and so on.
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One of the strengths of women’s studies is that, applied to a discipline,
it can reveal it in a new light. Thinking about the interplay of gender and
science brings fresh insights about science itself. “The culture of no culture”
is what the anthropologist Sharon Traweek has called the view of physics
that is traditionally held by physicists and their students (Traweek 1988, 132),
one of perfect objectivity: mechanistic, no genders, inhuman. But how can
this be? I have used the word repeatedly and somewhat matter-of-factly in
this essay. This term might be defined as the “patterns of expectations, be-
liefs, values, ideas and material objects that define the taken for granted way
of life for a society or group” (Anderson 1983, 382). According to this defi-
nition, how could the community of physical scientists not have a culture,
and a rich one at that? We often lose potential physics students, the so-called
“second tier” of Tobias’s study (Tobias 1990), mostly women and people of
color who rebel at what they either perceive to be Traweek’s nonculture, or
a culture to be avoided—like the culture of defense professionals, perhaps.
But a modern understanding of the history and practice of physics, one that
acknowledges formerly “invisible” participants and celebrates the collabo-
rative aspects of research, portrays a very different side of the culture. Hap-
pily, the culture of physics can be heterogeneous without sacrificing any of
the empirical soundness of physical theory thanks to (Wigner’s blessed) ap-
propriateness of a mathematical analysis of the world. Research in physical
science has throughout history been a cooperative, as well as creative, en-
deavor.18 Understanding old physics, and articulating new physics, does not
require a Y chromosome. It does require chromosomes. It is something re-
quiring intellect, passion, and personhood.
Notes
1. A few representative works on perceived qualities of scientists are D. C. Fort
and H. L. Varney, “How Students See Scientists,” Science and Children (May
1989), 8; M. C. LaFollette, Making Science Our Own (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1990); and R. D. Hanes, From Faust to Strangelove: Representa-
tions of the Scientist in Western Literature (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1994).
2. A few recent compendia on past and present women scientists are: B. F.
Shearer, ed., Notable Women in the Physical Sciences: A Biographical Dictionary
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1996); B. F. Shearer, ed., Notable Women in the
Life Sciences: A Biographical Dictionary (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1996);
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H. M. Pycior et al., eds., Creative Couples in the Sciences (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers University Press, 1996); M. Alic, Hypatia’s Heritage (Boston: Beacon,
1986); P. G. Amir-Am and D. Outram, eds., Uneasy Careers and Intimate Lives
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1987); M. B. Ogilvie, Women
in Science: Antiquity through the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1990). Some books on contemporary women scientists are S. Ambrose
et al., eds., Journeys of Women in the Sciences (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1997); M. Morse, Women Changing Science: Voices from a Field in Transi-
tion (New York: Insight Books, 1995). Some recent biographies of notable
physicists are R. L. Sime, Lise Meitner: A Life in Physics (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1996); S. Quinn, Marie Curie: A Life (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1995); J. W. Brewer, ed., Emmy Noether: A Tribute to Her Life and Work
(Ann Arbor: Books on Demand, 1981).
3. Indeed, it might have been better to see no names at all than to see a student
produce a list like this: (1) Pochohontas (the Disney movie of that name had
recently been released), (2) Lizzie Borden . . .
4. While the U.S. Department of Patents does not record the sex of patent appli-
cants, they attempt to infer these data. A full report “Buttons to Biotech—U.S.
Patenting by Women, 1977 to 1988,” (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Tech-
nology Assessment and Forecast Program, January 1989) chronicles the period
mentioned in the title. Supplementary, updated figures show that the percent-
age of patents that include at least one woman inventor have grown each year
from 1988 onward. The figure of 8 percent corresponds to the year 1993.
5. For example, J. M. Gage, Woman as Inventor (issued under the auspices of the
New York State Woman Suffrage Association) (Fayetteville, N.Y.: F. A. Darling
Printer, 1870), was followed in 1888 by a compendium of women inventors
issued by the U.S. Patent Office. Among more recent books are P. C. Ives, Cre-
ativity and Inventions: The Genius of Afro-Americans and Women in the United States
and their Patents (Arlington, Va.: Research Unlimited, 1987); E. A. Vare, Moth-
ers of Invention: From the Bra to the Bomb: Forgotten Women (New York: Morrow,
1988); A. L. MacDonald, Feminine Ingenuity: Women and Invention in America
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1992); A. Stanley, Mothers and Daughters of In-
vention: Notes for a Revised History (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1993).
There are many more books on this topic available today.
6. See, for example, R. Steinberg and L. Haignere, “Separate but Equivalent:
Equal Pay for Work of Comparable Worth” in Beyond Methodology, ed. M. M.
Fonow and J. A. Cook (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); E.
Boserup, Woman’s Role in Economic Development (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1970).
7. Scheibinger notes that though the Royal Society was founded so as to be open
to men of all backgrounds “both learned and vulgar . . . the vast majority of
the members . . . came from the ranks of gentlemen virtuosi, or wellborn con-
noisseurs of the new science” (Scheibinger 1989, 25).
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8. Sime’s biography of Meitner provides many details about the Nobel prize,
and the attitudes of Hahn and other scientists close to the issue (many of
whom understood Meitner’s partnership in the discovery and felt her lack of
acknowledgment unjust). Meitner’s comment was that Hahn “simply sup-
pressed the past. . . . I am a part of that suppressed past” (Sime 1996, x).
9. “Let the data speak for themselves . . . scientists demand. The problem with
this argument is, of course, that data never do speak for themselves”—Eve-
lyn Fox Keller (Keller 1985, 130–31).
10. See, for example, Anderson (1983), chapter 2, for a discussion of the interplay
between culturally determined gender and everyday life. For arguments that
scientific endeavors are not immune, see M. Namenwirth 1986, as well as
Harding 1991.
11. See, for example, Stevenson and Byerly (1995) for an introduction to how sci-
entists’ activities are shaped by culture and society.
12. For example, chapter 3 of A. Standen, Science Is a Sacred Cow is entitled “Sci-
ence at Its Best—Physics” and begins: “The various sciences can all be
arranged in order, going from fairly good through mediocre to downright bad.
Allowing the scientists to put their best foot forward, we may as well begin
with the best of the sciences, which is physics” (Standen 1950, 59).
13. Interesting, in this regard, is Galileo’s determination to distinguish quantities
that are “really present in physical objects from those that are merely subjec-
tive qualities of human sensation” (Stevenson and Byerly 1995, 27), and to
make the former the focus of his studies.
14. See also the case studies involving priority disputes among famous scientists
in Stevenson and Byerly (1995) chapter 5.
15. Answer: So that they can tell their wives they are with their mistresses, and
their mistresses that they are with their wives, and spend the night at the lab.
16. “Male science, male alchemy is partially rooted in male uterus envy, in the de-
sire to create something miraculous out of male inventiveness.”—Phyllis
Chesler, About Men (quoted in Frechet 1991, 216, 217).
17. See, for example, C. Merchant, The Death of Nature (San Francisco: Harper
and Row, 1980), chapter 7.
18. One book that emphasizes these and other feminine-identified aspects of sci-
entific culture is L. J. Shepherd, Lifting the Veil: The Feminine Face of Science
(Boston: Shamhala Press, 1993).
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